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Abstract
We examine ﬁrm managers’ incentives to commit fraud in a model where ﬁrms seek
funding from investors and investors can monitor ﬁrms at a cost in order to get more precise
information about ﬁrm prospects. We show that fraud incentives are highest when business
conditions are good, but not too good: in exceptionally good times, even weaker ﬁrms
can get funded without committing fraud, and in bad times investors are more vigilant
and it is harder to commit fraud successfully. As investors’ monitoring costs decrease, the
region in which fraud occurs shifts towards better business conditions. It follows that if
business conditions are suﬃciently strong, a decrease in monitoring costs actually increases
the prevalence of fraud. If investors can only observe current business conditions with noise,
then the incidence of fraud will be highest when investors begin with positive expectations
that are disappointed ex post. Finally, increased disclosure requirements can exacerbate
fraud. Our results shed light on the incidence of fraud across the business cycle and across
diﬀerent sectors.
JEL codes: E320, G300, G380.
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“It’s only when the tide goes out that you can see who’s swimming naked.”
Warren Buﬀett
Booms and busts are a common feature of market economies. Almost as common is the
belief that a boom encourages and conceals ﬁnancial fraud and misrepresentation by ﬁrms,
which are then revealed by the ensuing bust. Examples in the last century include the 1920s
(Galbraith, 1955), the “go-go” market of the 1960s and early 1970s (Labaton, 2002, Schilit,
2002), and the use of junk bonds and LBOs in the 1980s (Kaplan and Stein, 1993). Most
recently, the long boom of the 1990s has been followed, ﬁrst by recession, then by revelations
of ﬁnancial chicanery at many of America’s largest companies.
Some argue that fraud in booms is exacerbated by inadequate rules and regulations.
In the 1930s, this view led to the establishment of the SEC and numerous regulations on
ﬁnancial institutions; in the early 1990s, to anti-takeover legislation; and in the crisis just
past, to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Yet others have argued that the root cause for the fraud
lies in investors’ overly optimistic expectations, which make fraudulently positive reports
seem more plausible. For example, the Economist (2002) suggests:
The remedy is disclosure, honest accounting, non-executive directors empowered
to do their job — and, as always, skeptical shareholders looking out for their own
interests. Without doubt, the last of these is most important of all. Alas, it is beyond
the reach of regulators and legislators. ... The most important lesson of this bust, like
every bust, is: buyer beware.
In this paper, we examine these arguments in a simple model of ﬁnancing and investment.
Firms require external funding. Rational investors may either rely on public but noisy signals
of ﬁrms’ prospects or else investigate these prospects more carefully. A ﬁrm with poor
prospects may commit fraud, which makes the noisy public signal look more attractive but
does not fool investors who investigate more carefully. Fraud is most likely to occur if times
are relatively good and investors are relatively optimistic about the average ﬁrm’s prospects.
1Fraud is less likely in exceptionally good times, however, since investors are rationally willing
to fund a ﬁrm even if its public signal is relatively unattractive. Fraud is also less likely in
bad times, when investors are cautious about investing and so are less easily fooled.
Investors’ expectations about the average ﬁrm’s prospects change over time. In a dynamic
setting, the incidence of fraud is highest when the business cycle has turned down but
investors are not yet aware of this. Thinking conditions are still reasonably good, investors
fund ﬁrms that “look good,” and ﬁrms with poor prospects commit fraud so as to obtain
funding. These very acts of fraud obscure the extent of the downturn. Eventually, reality
intrudes, the downturn is revealed, and the incidence of fraud is much greater than anyone
anticipated. Yet investors and ﬁrms have acted rationally; good times are most likely to lead
to widespread fraud when the good times are ending, but the end of good times can only
be known ex post. Indeed, it is when a number of ﬁrms that had been doing well are seen
to be doing badly that investors know that the good times have ended. To reverse Buﬀett,
it’s only when you see a lot of people swimming naked that you know that the tide has gone
out.
Thus, a model with rational behavior can reproduce many features of the boom-bust-
fraud pattern. Although we do not claim that investors are always perfectly rational, the fact
that rationality does not rule out this pattern suggests limits to the “buyer beware” school
of policy response. Furthermore, our model suggests that measures aimed at improving
disclosure per se can be counterproductive. To see why this is the case, however, we must
ﬁrst present our model in more detail.
In our model, managers need funding for their ﬁrms. Firms can be good or bad (i.e.,
investing in them can be positive or negative NPV), but due to private control beneﬁts,
managers want to get funding regardless. Investors observe a noisy free signal of the ﬁrm’s
true type, after which they can decide whether or not to monitor the ﬁrm more closely.
Monitoring is costly, but reveals the ﬁrm’s true type. Managers with bad projects can
commit fraud, which increases the chance that the noisy free signal will be high even though
the ﬁrm is truly bad. Committing fraud is costly to managers, reﬂecting eﬀort costs and the
2chance that they may be caught and penalized.
In this simple model, the behavior of ﬁrms and investors depends heavily on the cost
of monitoring and on investors’ prior beliefs on the likelihood that any given ﬁrm is of
good type. If investors’ prior is low, they will be concerned that even a high signal has a
signiﬁcant chance of coming from one of the many bad ﬁrms in the economy. This being the
case, even a high signal will not be funded without further monitoring, so that fraud yields
no beneﬁt to bad ﬁrms. As the prior improves, investors begin to fund high-signal ﬁrms
without monitoring. Now fraud becomes attractive: by increasing the probability of a high
signal, fraud increases the odds that a bad ﬁrm can get funding without the monitoring that
would otherwise expose it. Fraud incentives continue to increase with the prior until high
signals are never monitored and all bad ﬁrms commit fraud. If the prior increases further
still, eventually there are so many good ﬁrms that the possibility that a low signal comes
from an unlucky good ﬁrm is high enough to make unmonitored investment in a low-signal
ﬁrm somewhat attractive. As the prior rises further, the probability with which low-signal
ﬁrms are funded without monitoring increases. This means that, even without fraud, a bad
ﬁrm has an increasing chance of being funded, so incentives to commit costly fraud decrease.
If the prior is extremely high, investors may be willing to fund all ﬁrms without even paying
attention to the free signal, in which case costly fraud has no beneﬁt at all.
As monitoring costs fall, the thresholds for diﬀerent “regimes” – fund high-signal ﬁrms
without monitoring, fund low-signal ﬁrms without monitoring, etc. – are shifted towards
better business conditions. Intuitively, fraud is only attractive when investors do not always
monitor high-signal ﬁrms. Because lower monitoring costs make monitoring a more attractive
option, the prior must be higher before investors cut back on monitoring high-signal ﬁrms.
Paradoxically, the link between good times and fraud becomes stronger as monitoring costs
fall.
Now suppose that investors are not perfectly informed on the relative frequency of good
and bad ﬁrms: the relative frequency of good ﬁrms could be higher (“good state of the
economy”) or lower (“bad state of the economy”) than their prior beliefs. Over time, actual
3ﬁrm successes and failures will reveal more information about the true state of the economy.
Suppose that the prior is low, so that investors put a high weight on the likelihood that
the true state of the economy is bad rather than good. Later events will either reveal that the
true state was bad, hence, a little worse than the prior, or reveal that, in fact, the prior was
too pessimistic and there were many more good ﬁrms than expected. In the ﬁrst case, there
will not have been much fraud, since investors were suspicious to begin with and monitored
heavily. In the second case, there will have been even less fraud in total, because bad ﬁrms
were less frequent than suspected; indeed, ex post, the problem will be that many good ﬁrms
that had low signals found it impossible to get funding.
By contrast, suppose that the prior is high enough that high-signal ﬁrms are not mon-
itored, though low-signal ﬁrms are either monitored or not funded at all. If later events
prove that the state of the economy was in fact good, there will not have been much fraud;
bad ﬁrms did commit fraud, but there were few of them. On the other hand, if later events
prove that the prior was too optimistic and the true state was bad, fraud will be prevalent;
bad ﬁrms did commit fraud, and there were many more of them than expected. In this
case, although some may later opine that the problem was that investors were insuﬃciently
skeptical, investors in fact behaved rationally given their prior; the problem was that the
true state of the economy was known only noisily and with a lag.
In fact, the economy evolves over time, so that the relative numbers of good and bad ﬁrms
are always changing and investors are always updating their beliefs about these numbers.
One source of information for such updating is free signals from ﬁrms. If these signals can
be manipulated, then when bad ﬁrms commit fraud, free signals are noisier, and so rational
investors are slower to update their beliefs. Supposing that a long stream of positive cash
ﬂows does eventually convince investors that times are likely to be good, it will be hard for
them to detect when the tide has turned and the number of bad ﬁrms has increased – at
least, until the projects of the bad ﬁrms have come oﬀ badly.
Thus, our model provides a rational explanation for why long booms often seem to end
in a wave of failures and fraud. Saying that investors should know that the tide can turn is
4not the same as saying that they know when it has turned. So long as they think the boom
is most likely to continue, they are justiﬁed in focusing their monitoring on low-signal ﬁrms.
When the boom does end, ex post, many of the ﬁrms that have been funded will turn out
to have committed fraud — but ex ante, the investors could not predict precisely when the
boom would end and the number of bad ﬁrms would escalate.
Our model yields other counterintuitive predictions. When times are bad enough that
high-signal ﬁrms are monitored with some probability, a decrease in the cost of monitoring
increases monitoring and decreases fraud, as one would expect. By contrast, when times are
good enough that monitoring focuses only on ﬁrms that produce low signals, a decrease in
the cost of monitoring increases monitoring and increases fraud. This follows the intuition
discussed before: fraud helps bad ﬁrms avoid low signals, and in good times, low signals are
what triggers monitoring.
Again, this helps motivate behavior that at ﬁrst glance seems completely myopic. In bad
times (such as the early 1990s or right now), additional ﬁnancing is hard to come by even for
ventures with good ideas and track records. By contrast, in the good times of the late 1990s,
shareholders and boards were routinely castigated in the business press for overreacting to
bad news, so that the watchword for corporations was to avoid bad news at all costs. Yet
even if the ongoing reduction in costs of telecommunication and computing have lowered
the cost of analyzing ﬁrms, our model suggests that investors may optimally choose to focus
their analysis on bad news in good times. If shareholders can only punish managers directly
by selling stock (which may then trigger action by the board), then our model is consistent
with the behavior that has been seen.
Although our model relies on fully rational behavior, we are not saying that investors are
in reality fully rational. Instead, we are saying that fully rational behavior already exhibits
features that are broadly in line with the facts. If investors are inclined to waves of excessive
optimism and pessimism, this will further exacerbate these eﬀects.
In addition to these “time series” eﬀects, our model has cross-sectional implications for
diﬀerent industries during a given business cycle. For example, if investor priors in a given
5sector are extremely high, we should see little fraud; if priors in a sector are moderately high,
then the potential for fraud increases. This may motivate diﬀerences between the “dot-com”
and telecom industries during the boom of the 1990s. Investors were so willing to believe
in the chances of success of any ﬁrm whose name that ended in “dot-com” that fraud per
se was largely unnecessary. By contrast, in telecoms, investors, though optimistic, did pay
attention to reported revenues and earnings; consistent with our prediction, this sector seems
to have experienced far more cases of accounting fraud.
Our results also have policy implications. Regulators try to prevent or punish fraud that
leads to the wasteful funding of bad ﬁrms. As we have shown, simply saying “buyer beware”
may not do much to prevent fraud. Nevertheless, tougher disclosure standards can actually
worsen the problem. If tougher disclosure standards improve the precision of free signals
absent fraud, managers have more incentive to commit fraud to “noise things up.” To be
eﬀective, disclosure standards must directly make fraud more diﬃcult.
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. We discuss the relevant literature in Section
2. In Section 3 we introduce our model and key assumptions. In Section 4 we analyze the
behavior of investors and ﬁrms in a setting where all agents know the underlying distribution
of good and bad ﬁrms in the economy. In Section 5 we show how our results are aﬀected by
changes in the underlying parameters and how these can motivate actual behavior by ﬁrms
and investors. We also show how agents’ beliefs can be grounded in a framework in which
the underlying state of the economy is unknown, leading to “surprising” volumes of fraud in
certain circumstances. In Section 6 we discuss how our model’s main results are robust to
changes in our simple assumptions, and in Section 7 we conclude.
2 Literature Review
Although ours is the ﬁrst paper that we are aware of that ties fraudulent behavior by ﬁrms
to changing investor actions over the business cycle, there are a number of papers that are
related to the tenor of our analysis. For example, a growing body of work examines “credit
cycles” – the idea that banks and other credit suppliers engage in behavior that exacerbates
6business cycle eﬀects, making credit even tighter in recessions, and looser in expansions, than
pure demand-side eﬀects would suggest. Among these, the closest to our paper is Ruckes
(1998), who models how competing bank lenders’ incentives to screen potential borrowers
exacerbate cyclical variations in credit standards. None of these papers address borrower
incentives to commit fraud, which is our key focus.
Another related paper is Persons and Warther’s (1997) model of booms and busts in the
adoption of ﬁnancial innovations. In their model, individual ﬁrms decide whether to adopt
a new ﬁnancial technique based on the information that earlier adopters’ experience noisily
reveals. They show that such waves of adoption always end on a sour note, in the sense that
the most recent adopters always lose money. Ex post, the information that ends the wave is
always negative, but the timing of the end is ex ante random, and the latest adopters were
behaving rationally based on the information available at the time. Like our model, this
suggests that busts are always surprising yet may still be rational. Nevertheless, Persons
and Warther do not address the role of fraud, and the mechanism of their model focuses on
the evolution of social learning about a static innovation rather than investor-ﬁrm conﬂicts
and behavior in the face of private information.
Four recent papers in the ﬁnance literature also focus on managerial incentives to commit
fraud. Bebchuk and Bar-Gill (2002) present a model in which ﬁrms may commit fraud so
as to obtain better terms when issuing shares to raise funds for further investments; this
incentive to commit fraud increases if managers can sell some of their own shares in the
short run or if accounting and legal rules are lax. Goldman and Slezak (2003) present a
model where optimal managerial pay-for-performance contracts balance incentives to exert
eﬀort against incentives to commit fraud; increased regulatory penalties for fraud can some-
times increase the equilibrium incidence of fraud, and rules that reduce auditor incentives to
collude with managers decrease the incidence of fraud but paradoxically reduce ﬁrm value.
Subrahmanyam (2003) presents a model where more intelligent managers are better both at
running ﬁrms and at committing successful (undetected) fraud; as a result, investors may
prefer more intelligent managers and a higher incidence of fraud in exchange for higher av-
7erage performance. Unlike our paper, these three papers do not examine how changes in
economic conditions aﬀect manager’s incentives to commit fraud and investor’s incentives
to monitor managers, which is our primary focus.1 Finally, Noe (2003) analyzes a diﬀerent
type of fraud, in which a ﬁrm’s manager “tunnels” value from the ﬁrm into her own pocket.
He focuses on providing the manager with incentives to perform rather than steal the funds
that she has raised.
There are a number of studies in the accounting literature that focus on fraud incentives
in the relationships between ﬁrms and their auditors. Some of these examine incentives to
underreport earnings in order to hide managerial perquisite consumption; see for example
Morton (1993). Closer to our focus are papers that examine the incentive to over-report;
examples include Newman and Noel (1989), Shibano (1990), and Caplan (1999). Empirical
work on SEC enforcement actions aimed at violations of Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) suggests that over-reporting aimed at boosting share prices and improv-
ing access to additional capital is in fact the more frequent source of ﬁrm-wide ﬁnancial
misrepresentation.2 Unlike our paper, these auditing papers on over-reporting focus on the
impact of control systems and auditor incentives; they do not examine how fraud incentives
change with overall business conditions. A further distinction is that auditors are typically
penalized for failing to detect fraud. By focusing on the incentives of investors, we emphasize
the fact that investors are not concerned with ﬁnding fraud per se, but rather with ﬁnding
good investment opportunities. As already noted, this can lead to counterintuitive results
when investors rationally focus their scrutiny on low signals rather than high ones.
Finally, our work contrasts with the growing literature that examines how bounded ra-
tionality can cause market overreactions. The critical diﬀerence is that our model relies on
rational behavior throughout. As noted earlier, to the extent that deviations from rationality
do lead investors’ priors to overreact to recent information, they will exacerbate the eﬀects
1Goldman and Slezak (2003) do show that an inﬂux of naive, overly optimistic investors into the stock
market increases the equilibrium incidence of fraud. Again, our model shows that such ﬂuctuations can
occur even when all investors are perfectly rational.
2For example, Peroz et al. (1991) ﬁnd that fraud usually takes the form of earnings overstatement, and
that news of an SEC enforcement action depresses stock price. Dechow et al. (1996) ﬁnd that ﬁrms that
commit fraud tend to have higher ex ante needs for additional funds.
8we describe.
3 Basic Model and Assumptions
In this section we lay out the single period model that provides the framework for analyzing
the incidence of fraud in Section 4. The economy consists of equal numbers of ﬁrm managers




















Figure 1: Time line
3.1 Firms and Managers
Each manager controls a ﬁrm that requires an investment of I units of cash at the start of
the period. At the end of the period, the ﬁrm returns a random contractable cash ﬂow that
equals R > I with probability µi and zero with probability 1 ¡ µi, where i 2 fg;bg is the
ﬁrm’s type. We assume that 0 · µb < µg < 1. We also assume that
Ng = µgR ¡ I > 0 Nb = ¡(µbR ¡ I) > 0; (1)
i.e., g ﬁrms are positive net present value investments (“good”), whereas b ﬁrms are negative
NPV investments (“bad”). Note that Nb is the absolute value of the expected loss from
investing in a bad ﬁrm.
In addition to generating contractable cash ﬂows, a funded ﬁrm generates C in noncon-
tractable control beneﬁts which the manager consumes. This implies that, all else equal, a
manager prefers to get her project funded, regardless of her ﬁrm’s type.
9Managers know their own ﬁrm’s type, but outsiders can discover this only by monitoring
the ﬁrm at a cost, as we discuss below. The prior probability that any given ﬁrm is good
is given by ¹, where ¹ 2 (0;1). This prior is common knowledge. For the moment, we
take this prior as exogenously given; we discuss how this can be embedded in a multi-period
framework in Section 5.
3.2 Investors
Investors are each endowed with I units of the generic good. At the beginning of the period,
each investor is randomly matched with a manager and her ﬁrm. After being matched, the
investor receives a free but noisy signal of the ﬁrm’s type, and may then decide whether
or not to expend additional eﬀort and learn the ﬁrm’s type more precisely. Based on any
information that she has, the investor then can make a take-it-or-leave-it investment oﬀer
to the manager. The manager does not have time to approach another investor, so if the
investor does not make her an oﬀer, the manager cannot get funding for her ﬁrm.
Our assumptions of random matching and take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers are made for simplic-
ity; altering them would not change the essentials of our analysis. For simplicity, we also
assume that investors cannot pay oﬀ bad ﬁrms to reveal their type; in practice, doing so
is likely to be prohibitively expensive since a large number of incompetent managers would
start ﬁrms and apply to investors for the sole purpose of receiving that payment. (We return
to this issue of entry in Section 6 below.)
Thus, in equilibrium, if the investor does fund the ﬁrm, she receives all of the contractable
cash ﬂows that it produces. Nevertheless, since the manager receives control beneﬁts C if
the ﬁrm is funded and nothing if the ﬁrm is not funded, she will take any oﬀer that she is
given.
3.3 Signals, Fraud, and Monitoring
As just mentioned, right after managers and investors are matched, each investor receives a
free but noisy signal of the type of the manager’s ﬁrm. This signal should be thought of as
10a ﬁnancial report or a related public news release by the ﬁrm. We assume that this signal
takes on one of two values, h (“high”) and ` (“low”). We also assume that, absent fraud,
the signal is positively correlated with the ﬁrm’s true type:
Prfhjgg = ° >
1
2
> ¯ = Prfhjb; no fraudg:
The free signal is subject to manipulation by the manager (“fraud”). The manager decides
whether or not to commit fraud right after she and the investor are matched. Fraud costs
the manager an amount f, where f reﬂects both any eﬀort involved in committing fraud and
the chance that the manager is later caught and punished. We return to the issue of catching
and punishing fraud in Section 6. Fraud increases the probability that a bad ﬁrm generates
a high signal by ± < °¡¯; that is, Prfhjb; fraud g = ¯+± < °. Thus, fraud reduces the free
signal’s correlation with the ﬁrm’s type, but the free signal remains somewhat informative.3
Fraud is beneﬁcial to the manager to the extent it increases the manager’s chance of collecting
control beneﬁts C. It follows that fraud will never be attractive unless the cost of fraud f
is less than the maximum possible beneﬁt, i.e., f < ±C. Henceforth, we assume that this
condition holds.
In practical terms, fraud should be thought of as deliberate misstatement of the ﬁrm’s
results, either through altered ﬁnancial reports or a misleading news release. Such an eﬀort
increases the odds that a casual glance at the ﬁrm’s results will lead investors to think that
the ﬁrm is in good shape – in terms of our model, it increases the probability that the public
signal is high.
For simplicity, we assume that only bad ﬁrms commit fraud. As we discuss in Section 6,
allowing good ﬁrms to commit fraud leaves most of our results qualitatively unchanged, so
long as bad ﬁrms have relatively more to gain from fraud.
Suppose that the bad ﬁrm commits fraud with probability Á. Let b ¹s (Á) be the investor’s
posterior probability that the ﬁrm is good after she sees the free signal s. Applying Bayes’
3Allowing ± to exceed ° ¡ ¯ would have little eﬀect on our qualitative results; bad ﬁrms would never
commit fraud with certainty, but comparative statics would be unchanged.
11Rule, we have
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Notice that 8Á 2 (0;1),
b ¹` (0) < b ¹` (Á) < b ¹` (1) < ¹ < b ¹h (1) < b ¹h (Á) < b ¹h (0): (2)
As expected, the posterior probability that the ﬁrm is good is higher after observing a high
signal than it is after observing a low signal, and fraud makes the signal less precise, i.e. the
posterior approaches the prior as either ± or Á increase.
After receiving the free signal, the investor can choose to investigate the ﬁrm further
(“monitor”). Monitoring has an eﬀort cost of m > 0 and perfectly reveals the ﬁrm’s type.
Once more, the assumption that monitoring is perfect is not essential; the key point is that
monitoring gives more precise information about the ﬁrm’s type, and that fraud distorts the
information from monitoring relatively less that it distorts the free signal.
4 Investor and Firm Behavior
In this section, we analyze the equilibrium actions of the ﬁrm’s manager (henceforth, “ﬁrm”)
and of the investor. As we will see, the incidence of fraud is hump-shaped, ﬁrst increasing
in the prior probability that ﬁrms are good, then decreasing. When this prior probability
is below the point at which fraud reaches its peak, fraud increases as monitoring decreases;
when the prior is above this peak, fraud and monitoring decrease together. The peak in fraud
occurs for moderately good priors, and this peak shifts towards higher priors as monitoring
costs decrease.
Our analysis proceeds via backwards induction. We begin with the investor’s problem
12once she has observed the free signal; then we examine the ﬁrm’s decision on whether to
commit fraud before the free signal is sent. We conclude by characterizing the equilibrium
levels of fraud and monitoring as functions of the prior probability that ﬁrms are good.
4.1 The Investor’s Ex-Post Problem
After receiving the free signal s, the investor has three actions: she can choose not to invest
(action “N”); she can monitor and then invest if the ﬁrm is good (action “M”);4 or she
can invest without further monitoring (action “U” for unmonitored). Deﬁning VA as the
expected payoﬀ to action A, these three actions’ expected payoﬀs are as follows.
VN = 0
VM = b ¹Ng ¡ m
VU = b ¹Ng ¡ (1 ¡ b ¹)Nb
It is immediate that the investor’s decision depends only on the net present values Ng and
Nb of the two types of ﬁrms, the cost of monitoring m, and the investor’s posterior belief
on the probability b ¹ that the ﬁrm is good. For expositional ease, we deﬁne the following
threshold probabilities: If b ¹ = m
Ng ´ ¹1(m) then VN = VM; if b ¹ =
Nb
Nb+Ng ´ ¹2 then VN = VU;
and if b ¹ = 1 ¡ m
Nb ´ ¹3(m) then VM = VU. The next proposition describes the parameter
regions in which the various actions are optimal.
Proposition 1 (Optimal Investor Actions Given Posterior Beliefs). Suppose that, after
observing the free signal, the investor believes that the ﬁrm is good with probability b ¹. The
investor’s optimal action is as follows:
1. Do not invest if b ¹ < min(¹1(m);¹2).
2. Invest without monitoring if b ¹ ¸ max(¹2;¹3(m)).



















Figure 2: Posterior probabilities and optimal investor decisions.
Figure 2 displays key elements of the investor’s decision problem. Given the realization
of the free signal, the investor updates her beliefs about the ﬁrm’s type. Together, the
posterior b ¹ and the cost of monitoring m determine the optimal decision. If the cost of
monitoring is above m, then min(¹1(m);¹2) = max(¹2;¹3(m)) = ¹2 and monitoring is
always dominated by either not investing at all or unmonitored ﬁnancing. Here, the investor
provides unmonitored ﬁnance if and only if the posterior is above the threshold ¹2, which
determines where the investor is indiﬀerent between not investing and unmonitored ﬁnancing.
For monitoring costs below m, it is possible that the expected beneﬁt from monitoring
(avoiding investing in bad ﬁrms and losing Nb) may exceed the cost of monitoring m. If
b ¹ is such that m = b ¹Ng (the upward sloping line in Figure 2), we have VN = VM, and
the investor is indiﬀerent between monitored ﬁnance and not investing. For example, if
m = m0, the threshold for b ¹ is ¹1 (m0). If b ¹ is such that m = (1 ¡ b ¹)Nb (the downward
sloping line), we have VM = VU, and the investor is indiﬀerent between monitored ﬁnance
and unmonitored ﬁnance. For the example m = m0, this deﬁnes the threshold ¹3 (m0). It
4 Note that, given (1), it never pays to invest in a bad ﬁrm.
14follows that monitoring is optimal for intermediate posteriors, and the range of posteriors
for which it is optimal increases as the cost of monitoring m decreases.
Note that the investor’s decision depends only on the posterior b ¹, and not on how she
forms this posterior; diﬀerent combinations of the prior ¹ and the probability of fraud Á that
lead to the same posterior b ¹ lead to the same action.
4.2 The Manager’s Decision to Commit Fraud
Having dealt with the investor’s problem, we now examine the bad ﬁrm’s decision on whether
to commit fraud. This decision depends on the cost of fraud versus the expected beneﬁt
of fraud, which in turn depends on the investor’s response as described in Proposition 1.
Since monitoring detects bad ﬁrms, the ﬁrm only beneﬁts from fraud if fraud increases the
ﬁrm’s probability of receiving unmonitored funding. Two conditions must be satisﬁed: (i)
the investor’s posterior after a high signal is such that the investor is willing to provide
unmonitored funding, and (ii) the investor’s posterior after a low signal is such that she
provides unmonitored funding with strictly lower probability than that in the high-signal
case. On the other hand, as mentioned in the previous section, in equilibrium, fraud makes
the signal less precise, i.e. the posterior approaches the prior. This lessens the diﬀerence in
impact between high and low signals, reducing the gains from fraud.
In equilibrium, the incidence of fraud must be consistent with incentives. Thus, if the
manager’s expected beneﬁt strictly exceeds the cost f, she undertakes fraud with certainty
(Á = 1). If the beneﬁt equals the cost, she is willing to commit fraud with positive probability
(0 < Á < 1). Otherwise, she does not commit fraud at all.
We ﬁrst describe ﬁve diﬀerent ‘regimes’ which characterize the equilibrium; which regime
is relevant depends on the prior ¹ and to some extent on the cost of monitoring m. Deﬁne
¹UF = maxf¹3 (m);¹2g:
From Proposition 1, ¹UF is the posterior at which the investor is indiﬀerent between investing
15without monitoring and some other action. As noted above, unmonitored investment is
critical to fraud. If the posterior is always above ¹UF, there is no point to committing fraud;
bad ﬁrms always get funding regardless of the signals they send. Similarly, if the posterior
is always below ¹UF, there is also no point to committing fraud; because ﬁrms never get
funding without being monitored, bad ﬁrms cannot get funding regardless of the signals
they send. Thus ¹UF is the key to equilibrium behavior, as we now show.
The regimes are deﬁned as follows (the choice of names will become clearer below).
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There are two cases. In one case, monitoring is prohibitively costly, i.e. m > m; in the
other, m < m, and the ﬁrm may monitor in equilibrium. We begin with the case where
monitoring is possible.
Proposition 2 Assume m · m =
NbNg
Nb+Ng. Denote by ¸s the probability of monitoring with
a signal s, by ·s the probability of unmonitored ﬁnance with a signal s, and by Á the bad
ﬁrm’s probability of committing fraud. The equilibrium decisions are as follows:
1. Fund-Everything Regime. The investor never monitors (¸h = ¸` = 0), all ﬁrms are
funded regardless of the signal (·h = ·` = 1), and there is no fraud (Á = 0).
2. Optimistic Regime. High-signal ﬁrms are always funded without monitoring (¸h = 0
and ·h = 1). Low-signal ﬁrms are funded without monitoring with probability ·` =
1¡
f
±C and are monitored otherwise (¸` =
f
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163. Trust-Signals Regime. High-signal ﬁrms are always funded without monitoring (¸h = 0
and ·h = 1). Low-signal ﬁrms are never funded without monitoring (·` = 0). Bad
ﬁrms always commit fraud (Á = 1).
4. Skeptical Regime. High-signal ﬁrms are funded without monitoring with probability
·h =
f
±C and are monitored otherwise (¸h = 1 ¡
f
±C). Low-signal ﬁrms are never










5. No-Trust Regime. Firms are never funded without being monitored (·h = ·` = 0) and
there is no fraud (Á = 0).



































Figure 3: Five Regimes.
Figure 3 shows which (¹;m) pairs fall into each regime, both for the case where monitoring
is feasible, as described in the preceding proposition, and for the case where monitoring
17is prohibitively expensive, as described in Proposition 3 below. The darker shaded region
consists of all (¹;m) pairs for which bad ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to commit fraud with certainty.
In the lighter shaded regions, bad ﬁrms commit fraud with probability strictly between zero
and one. In the unshaded regions, there is no fraud at all.
Returning to Proposition 2, the boundaries of the ﬁve regimes depend on b ¹s (Á), which
again is the investor’s posterior belief that the ﬁrm is good after seeing the free signal s
and assuming that the bad ﬁrm commits fraud with probability Á. In the Fund-Everything
regime, the prior ¹ is so high that the investor is willing to provide unmonitored ﬁnance
regardless of the signal. In this case, the fraction of good ﬁrms in the population is so high
that even a low signal is very likely to have come from a good ﬁrm. Since all ﬁrms are
funded, there is no beneﬁt from committing fraud in this regime.
In the Optimistic regime, either the prior ¹ or the cost of monitoring m is somewhat lower.
Here, a high signal still leaves the investor choosing to fund the ﬁrm without monitoring, but
a low signal is bad enough that the investor prefers to monitor with some probability.5 In
this regime, monitoring actually encourages fraud, since bad ﬁrms that produce a low signal
may be monitored and denied funding.
In the Trust-Signals regime, b ¹` (1) < ¹3 (m) < b ¹h (1). Here, only high signals receive
unmonitored ﬁnance; low signals are either monitored or rejected (the choice depends on
whether or not b ¹` (0) exceeds ¹1 (m)). Either way, bad ﬁrms are not ﬁnanced if they produce
a signal `, so their incentive to commit fraud is higher than it would be in the Optimistic
regime. In this regime, they commit fraud with certainty.
With lower values of ¹ or m, we enter the Skeptical regime. In this regime, b ¹h (1) <
¹3 (m) < b ¹h (0). The priors in this regime are low enough that the investor ﬁnds it optimal
to monitor even high signals with positive probability. Because the bad ﬁrm may not get
ﬁnancing even if it manages to obtain a high signal, the gains from fraud are lower than
those in the Trust-Signals regime. Thus bad ﬁrms commit fraud with probability strictly
5 More precisely, in the Optimistic regime we have b ¹` (0) < ¹3 (m) < b ¹` (1). If there were no chance of
fraud in equilibrium, the investor would strictly prefer to monitor after a low signal; if there were fraud with
certainty, the investor would strictly prefer to not monitor; thus, in equilibrium, the investor monitors with
probability between 0 and 1.
18less than one.
Finally, for very low values of ¹, b ¹h (0) < ¹3 (m). In this No-Trust regime, investor’s
posteriors are so low that all ﬁrms are either monitored or rejected, regardless of the signal.
Since there is no unmonitored ﬁnance, there is no gain to committing fraud, and so there is
no fraud in equilibrium.
Figure 3 is related to Figure 2, which shows the details of the investor’s ex-post decision
problem. The dashed lines in Figure 3 are equivalent to the solid lines in Figure 2. Our
focus is on the fraud decision: fraud is committed with positive probability in the vicinity
of the downward sloping line in Figure 2; the closer the pair (m;¹) to this line, the higher
(weakly) the probability of fraud. Thus fraud is most rewarding when from the investor’s
perspective, the ex ante diﬀerence between monitoring and providing unmonitored ﬁnance
is small.
The regimes described in Proposition 2 extend into the region with prohibitively high m
in a natural way (see Figure 3):
Proposition 3 Assume m > m =
NbNg
Nb+Ng, so that the investor never monitors. Denote by
·s the probability of unmonitored ﬁnance with a signal s, and by Á the bad ﬁrm’s probability
of committing fraud. The equilibrium decisions are as follows:
1. Fund-Everything Regime. All ﬁrms are funded regardless of the signal (·h = ·` = 1),
and there is no fraud (Á = 0).
2. Optimistic Regime. High-signal ﬁrms are always funded (·h = 1). Low-signal ﬁrms are
funded with probability ·` = 1 ¡
f
±C and denied funding otherwise. Bad ﬁrms commit
fraud with probability Á = 1
±
³
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3. Trust-Signals Regime. High-signal ﬁrms are always funded (·h = 1). Low-signal ﬁrms
are never funded (·` = 0). Bad ﬁrms always commit fraud (Á = 1).
4. Skeptical Regime: High-signal ﬁrms are funded without monitoring with probability
·h =
f
±C and denied funding otherwise. Low-signal ﬁrms are never funded (·` = 0).









195. No-Trust Regime: ﬁrms are never funded (·h = ·` = 0) and there is no fraud (Á = 0).
Proof. See the Appendix.
If m > m, monitoring is prohibitively expensive, and the investor either rejects the ﬁrm
or provides unmonitored ﬁnancing. The ﬁve regimes are completely analogous to those in
Proposition 2. The main diﬀerence is that if a regime calls for monitoring when m · m, it
calls for denying funding when m > m.
Our next result is a straightforward consequence of Propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition 4 Both the probability of fraud Á conditional on the ﬁrm being bad, and the ex-
ante probability of fraud (1 ¡ ¹)Á are hump-shaped in the prior ¹. There is no fraud for the
highest and lowest levels of ¹, the Fund-Everything and No-Trust regimes. In the Skeptical
regime the probabilities of fraud are increasing in ¹, while in the Optimistic regime they are
decreasing. In the Trust-Signals regime, the conditional probability is constant, while the
ex-ante probability is decreasing in ¹.








Figure 4: Fraud probability: ex-ante (dashed line) and conditional (solid line).
Figure 4 shows the conditional and ex-ante probabilities of fraud. The graphs consist
of ﬁve parts, corresponding to the ﬁve regimes described above. In the Skeptical regime,
20the probabilities increase with ¹. High-signal ﬁrms are monitored or denied funding with
positive probability, low-signal ﬁrms with certainty. Thus the investor is indiﬀerent between
monitoring (or denying funding to) high-signal ﬁrms and funding them without any further
information. All else equal, an increase in the prior ¹ makes the investor strictly unwilling to
monitor (or deny funding to) high-signal ﬁrms – but then the bad ﬁrm would prefer to commit
fraud with certainty, worsening the pool of high-signal ﬁrms and destroying equilibrium. In
equilibrium, the probability of fraud must increase so as to restore balance.
In the Optimistic regime, the probabilities decrease with ¹. The investor strictly prefers
to fund high-signal ﬁrms, and is indiﬀerent between monitoring (or denying funding to) low-
signal ﬁrms and funding them without further information. Here, an increase in the prior
makes the investor strictly prefer to fund low-signal ﬁrms without monitoring – but then
bad ﬁrms would have no reason to commit fraud, worsening the pool of low-signal ﬁrms and
destroying equilibrium. In equilibrium, the probability of fraud decreases so as to restore
balance.
This accounts for the results on the bad ﬁrms’ conditional probability of fraud Á; the
results on the ex ante probability of fraud (1 ¡ ¹)Á follow immediately.
5 Determinants of Fraud
Having established the properties of equilibria in the various regimes, we now turn to the
question of how various parameters aﬀect the incidence of fraud. We show that, while
certain results are constant across regimes, others depend heavily on whether the regime
is Skeptical or Optimistic. In particular, the Skeptical regime is the more intuitive case;
here, monitoring discourages fraud, and other parameter eﬀects are as one would expect.
By contrast, the Optimistic regime is counterintuitive; here, monitoring encourages fraud,
and several parameter eﬀects are the reverse of what one would expect. We then turn to a
discussion of how our results are aﬀected by dynamic considerations.
We begin with the comparative statics of the Skeptical regime.
21Proposition 5 In the Skeptical regime,
(i) The equilibrium probability that bad ﬁrms commit fraud (Á) is increasing in the prior ¹,
weakly increasing in the cost of monitoring m, and decreasing in the eﬃcacy of fraud ±. It is
increasing in the probability that good ﬁrms send high signals (°) and decreasing in the base
probability that bad ﬁrms send high signals (¯).
(ii) If the monitoring cost is low (m · m), then the equilibrium probability that high-signal
ﬁrms are monitored (¸h) is decreasing in the cost of fraud f and increasing in both the eﬃcacy
of fraud ± and in the level of private beneﬁts C. If the monitoring cost is high (m > m), then
the equilibrium probability that high-signal ﬁrms are denied funding is decreasing in the cost
of fraud f and increasing in both the eﬃcacy of fraud ± and in the level of private beneﬁts
C.
The intuition for part (i) of the proposition follows from the eﬀects of parameter changes
on the investor’s incentives to monitor the pool of ﬁrms that generate high signals. An
increase in the prior probability that ﬁrms are good or an increase in the probability that
good ﬁrms generate high signals improves the pool, lowering the investor’s incentives to
monitor or deny funding. This allows the probability that bad ﬁrms commit fraud (Á) to
increase until equilibrium is restored. An increase in the eﬃcacy of fraud or an increase in
the base probability that bad ﬁrms generate high signals has the opposite eﬀect. Finally,
if monitoring costs are suﬃciently low (m · m), an increase in the cost of monitoring
directly lowers the investor’s monitoring incentives, again allowing the probability of fraud
to increase. (If m > m, the investor never monitors, so changes in m have no eﬀect on the
probability of fraud.)
The intuition for part (ii) of the proposition is straightforward. The probability of
monitoring or funding denial is determined by the bad ﬁrm’s incentive condition – the point
at which it is indiﬀerent between committing fraud and not committing fraud. If the cost of
fraud increases, then fraud is less attractive, and less intensive monitoring or less frequent
funding denial suﬃces to deter fraud to the point of indiﬀerence. Higher private beneﬁts
make getting funded more attractive. Because generating a high signal is the only way
22that a bad ﬁrm has a chance of getting funded, fraud is more attractive, and again more
intensive monitoring or funding denial is needed. Finally, if fraud is more eﬀective, the pool
of high-signal ﬁrms worsens, all else equal, and more intensive monitoring or funding denial
is needed to restore balance.
As noted above, the Skeptical regime is the intuitive case. The investor’s decision about
partial monitoring or funding denial focuses on ﬁrms with high signals, and fraud gives a
bad ﬁrm a higher chance of entering this pool and getting funding. This leads to a direct
link between the intensity of monitoring or funding denial and fraud incentives. By contrast,
the Optimistic case is less intuitive. Here, partial monitoring or funding denial focuses
on ﬁrms with low signals, and fraud gives a bad ﬁrm a higher chance of exiting this pool
by generating a high signal and getting automatic funding. Thus, the link between the
intensity of monitoring and fraud incentives is now less direct. This can be seen in the
following proposition.
Proposition 6 In the Optimistic regime,
(i) The equilibrium probability that bad ﬁrms commit fraud (Á) is decreasing in the prior ¹
and the eﬃcacy of fraud ±, and weakly decreasing in the cost of monitoring m. It is increasing
in the probability that good ﬁrms send high signals (°) and decreasing in the probability that
bad ﬁrms send high signals (¯).
(ii) If the monitoring cost is low (m · m), then the equilibrium probability that low-signal
ﬁrms are monitored (¸`) is increasing in the cost of fraud f and decreasing in both the eﬃcacy
of fraud ± and in the level of private beneﬁts C. If the monitoring cost is high (m > m),
then the equilibrium probability that low-signal ﬁrms are denied funding is increasing in the
cost of fraud f and decreasing in both the eﬃcacy of fraud ± and the level of private beneﬁts
C.
As before, part (i) of the proposition follows from the eﬀects of parameter changes on the
investor’s incentives to tighten funding (i.e., monitor or deny funding, depending on whether
or not m · m) for the pool of ﬁrms with low signals. An increase in the prior probability that
a ﬁrm is good increases the fraction of low-signal ﬁrms that are good, reducing the investor’s
23incentives to tighten funding. Since a reduction in monitoring or funding denial makes fraud
less attractive (bad ﬁrms are more likely to be funded even if they get a low signal), the
probability of fraud falls until incentives are restored. An increase in the probability that
bad ﬁrms generate high signals — either with fraud (¯+±) or without it (¯) — also increases
the fraction of low-signal ﬁrms that are good, discouraging fraud. Conversely, an increase in
the probability that good ﬁrms generate high signals worsens the pool of low-signal ﬁrms,
increasing the investor’s incentives to tighten funding and thus encouraging fraud. Finally, if
monitoring costs are suﬃciently low (m · m), an increase in the cost of monitoring directly
lowers the investor’s monitoring incentives, discouraging fraud.
Part (ii) follows from the eﬀects of parameter changes on the bad ﬁrm’s incentives to
commit fraud. The diﬀerence is that now, more intensive monitoring or more frequent
funding denial decreases the probability that a bad ﬁrm with a low signal gets funded, and
so tighter funding encourages bad ﬁrms to commit fraud so as to improve their odds of
generating high signals. When fraud is more costly, fraud is less attractive, so more of the
low-signal ﬁrms are in fact bad ﬁrms, and tighter funding is required to restore equilibrium.
Conversely, since more eﬀective fraud or higher private control beneﬁts increase the quality
of the pool of low-signal ﬁrms, looser funding is required to restore equilibrium.
5.1 Implications
We now turn to some direct implications of our model. Perhaps the most striking result
is the way that many parameter changes have opposite eﬀects depending on whether the
equilibrium is Skeptical or Optimistic. As already suggested, this occurs because of the
diﬀering focus of investor scrutiny in these two regimes. In “skeptical” times, investors
strictly prefer to be “tough” (monitor or deny funding) with low-signal ﬁrms, but they
are somewhat “looser” with high-signal ﬁrms. As a result, changes in parameters aﬀect
investors’ behavior with high-signal ﬁrms but not with low-signal ﬁrms. The opposite is true
in “optimistic” times: now, investors strictly prefer to fund high-signal ﬁrms, but they apply
somewhat tougher standards to low-signal ﬁrms. In this case, changes in parameters aﬀect
24investors’ behavior with low-signal ﬁrms but not with high-signal ﬁrms, and so the eﬀects of
many parameter changes switch sign.
The results on monitoring in the Optimistic regime seem counterintuitive because we tend
to think of monitoring as focusing on detecting fraud. Of course, our model is very stylized,
but the underlying point is an important one: monitoring by investors is directed at ﬁnding
good investment opportunities, not detecting fraud per se. In the Optimistic regime, the
chance that a high signal comes from a good ﬁrm outweighs the chance that it comes from a
bad ﬁrm that has committed fraud. As a result, investors begin to loosen funding standards
for low-signal ﬁrms. Changes that further loosen these standards actually discourage fraud
because bad ﬁrms see less need for it – why commit fraud when you can get funded without
it?
Similarly counterintuitive results arise from changes in the underlying prior that ﬁrms
are good. In the Skeptical regime, an increase in this prior loosens funding standards and
encourages fraud, which is what we think of as normal behavior. By contrast, in the Op-
timistic regime, an increase in the prior loosens funding standards and discourages fraud.
Again, if investors are suﬃciently optimistic, there is less need for fraud to attain funding.
This last result may provide a partial explanation for what happened during the 1990s
boom; arguably, as information technology improved, it became easier for analysts and others
to “kick the tires” — but during the boom these eﬀorts were concentrated on ﬁrms that were
known as poor performers. Perversely, this may have increased the prevalence of fraud.
Another implication comes from the result that, as the cost of monitoring falls, the region
where fraud occurs shifts towards better prior beliefs (see Figure 3). This suggests that as
telecommunications and information processing costs have come down, the incidence of fraud
may be even more tilted towards better states of the world.
Our model is also consistent with diﬀerences in lending behavior across the business cycle.
The literature on credit cycles shows that lenders are more willing to make “Type I” errors
(rejecting or rationing good credits) in recessions, and more willing to make “Type II” errors
(lending to bad credits) in expansions. This is consistent with broad diﬀerences between the
25No-Trust and Skeptical regimes on the one hand and the Optimistic and Fund-Everything
regimes on the other. Although our model is not unique in predicting this result, it serves
as a useful reality check.
More interestingly, our results also have applications to the prevalence of fraud in dif-
ferent sectors. In the late 1990s, Internet or “dot-com” ﬁrms were viewed as “can’t miss”
opportunities, because of a widespread conviction that much conventional business would
migrate to the Internet in a relatively short period of time. Leaving aside the question of
whether so strong a conviction was rational, this view led to the ﬁnancing of many start-ups
that did not even have business plans (see e.g. Schenone, 2003). Yet there have been few
accusations of fraud directed at the Internet ﬁrms. By contrast, the telecoms sector, though
viewed very positively, was not the subject of such strong optimism in the 1990s. Recently,
numerous large telecoms ﬁrms (including WorldCom, Qwest, Global Crossing, and Lucent)
have been accused of fraudulent or misleading accounting. This diﬀerence is consistent with
our model: Internet ﬁrms may have fallen into or close to the Fund-Everything regime, in
which case there was no need to commit fraud, whereas the telecoms may have fallen into
the lower Optimistic regime, in which case fraud should have been expected.
Although our analysis suggests that there is an interesting contrast between “optimistic”
and “skeptical” regimes, some parameter eﬀects are the same in both. In particular, the
probability of fraud increases in the probability ° that good ﬁrms send high signals and
decreases in the probability ¯ that bad ﬁrms send high signals and in the eﬃcacy of fraud
±. As discussed above, changes in these “signal quality” parameters change the pool of
high- and low-signal ﬁrms in such a way that they have consistent eﬀects on bad ﬁrms’
choice between committing fraud and not committing fraud. For example, an increase in °
increases the number of good ﬁrms in the high-signal pool and reduces the number in the
low-signal pool. In the Skeptical regime, the improvement in the high-signal pool reduces
funding stringency and encourages fraud; in the Optimistic regime, the worsening of the
low-signal pool increases funding stringency and again encourages fraud.
These results on signal quality suggest that an improvement in the precision of the “base”
26or “raw” signal (i.e., an increase in ° and decrease in ¯) should increase the prevalence of
fraud. Intuitively, a more precise signal means that the bad ﬁrm has more chance of being
revealed, which gives it more incentive to try to hide matters by committing fraud and
“noising up” the signal. By contrast, an increase in the eﬃcacy of fraud makes investors pay
less attention to the free signal, increasing the odds that a bad ﬁrm will either be denied
funding outright or else monitored with the same end result.
The signal quality results also have implications for policy makers. Suppose that regu-
lators decide to toughen disclosure standards. If tougher disclosure means releasing more
details that give investors a better sense of the ﬁrm’s situation, bad ﬁrms will be less able
to get funding unless they fraudulently alter their results. Something of this sort may have
happened in the 1990s. The general trend throughout the decade was for annual reports
to release more and more details in the notes to the ﬁnancial statements, in large part in
response to demands for greater revelation from the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB). Although many complained that notes were becoming denser, the point is that
audited information that was not previously available was now disclosed. In the absence of
fraud or misrepresentation, investors could now do a better job of assessing a ﬁrm’s situation
— and so a number of ﬁrms began to game the system, in many cases crossing the line into
fraud. Thus, tougher disclosure laws can have the perverse eﬀect of increasing fraud.
5.2 Dynamic Considerations
Up until now, we have assumed that investors and ﬁrms know the prior distribution of ﬁrm
types without uncertainty. In practice, such priors are likely to be uncertain, since the
“true” state of the economy can only be known ex post, if at all. Moreover, the true state
of the economy is dynamic, which can complicate the inference problems of investors and
managers. As suggested in the introduction, these considerations can exacerbate the links
between fraud, booms, and busts.
To model these issues in a simple way, we assume that there are two possible true states
of the economy, one in which there are relatively many good ﬁrms (fraction ¹u of all ﬁrms)
27and one in which there are relatively few good ﬁrms (fraction ¹d of all ﬁrms, with ¹d < ¹u).
Furthermore, we assume that ¹u falls into the Fund-Everything regime, and ¹d falls into the
No-Trust regime. The true state cannot be observed, and all agents share common beliefs:
the probability that the state is ¹u is p0. It follows that the overall prior that any given ﬁrm
is good is ¹ = p0¹u + (1 ¡ p0)¹d.
First suppose that p0 is low. In this case, the ex-ante prior ¹ is low, corresponding to
either the No-Trust or (low) Skeptical regime. Bad ﬁrms are unlikely to commit fraud in
this case, since even high-signal ﬁrms are usually monitored before they are ﬁnanced. If, ex
post, the true state of the economy proves to be ¹d, there will be slightly more bad ﬁrms
than expected, but the overall incidence of fraud will still be low or nonexistent. If instead
the true state proves to be ¹u, there will be even fewer cases of fraud, funded projects will be
relatively successful, and investors’ conservatism may seem overblown, as more monitored
projects than expected will prove to be good.
Now suppose p0 is high, so that the ex-ante prior ¹ falls within the Trust-Signals or
Optimistic regime. Although bad ﬁrms will be committing fraud, if the true state later
proves to be ¹u, there will not be many bad ﬁrms, and the actual incidence of fraud will be
somewhat lower than expected. By contrast, if the true state proves to be ¹d, the numbers
of bad ﬁrms and fraud cases will be much higher than expected.
If the prior is higher still, of course, the equilibrium will fall into the upper end of the
Optimistic regime or even the Fund-Everything regime. In this case, fraud will be low or
nonexistent, even if the state proves to be ¹d, but in this last case many more funded projects
than expected will perform poorly.
All of this has taken p0 as given. In reality, p0 will arise from investors getting signals from
various ﬁrms and from some “actual” realizations (e.g., realized cash ﬂows in our model).
Note that the presence of fraud slows down updating in both directions: both high and
low signals become noisier. Thus, priors will be slower to shift in the “middle,” where bad
ﬁrms are likely to commit fraud. If beliefs begin with a p0 so high that the regime is Fund-
Everything, and then some bad realizations of the free signal shift p0 and thus ¹ into the
28Optimistic or Trust-Signals regime, further updating will be slowed.
If there were no change in the underlying state, then over time, investor beliefs would
ﬁnd their way to the true state. A more realistic assumption is that there is always some
chance that the underlying state governing the returns on new projects can shift – some
chance of transitioning from ¹d to ¹u, and another chance of transitioning the other way.
If by some chance beliefs do ﬁnd their way close to one or the other extreme, there will
always be some chance that the beliefs are “very wrong” due to a transition. Of course,
these transition probabilities limit how high or low p0 can go, but there is still a chance that
beliefs will be heavily weighted towards one extreme or the other, in which case “surprises”
of the sort already discussed will still be possible. In particular, once p0 and thus ¹ are in
the Optimistic regime, a period of slow updating from “free” signals (interim results) could
be followed either by a reassuring string of high cash ﬂows or a spate of low cash ﬂows that
suddenly reveal that the economy is in recession – followed in the last instance by a wave of
revelations of fraud.
In short, the agents in an economy may be “surprised” by changes in the economy’s
fundamentals. Although this notion is not especially surprising, it has strong implications
for the incidence and prevalence of fraud across the business cycle. As noted, when times are
bad — in terms of our model, in the No-Trust or Skeptical regimes — positive surprises will
lead to lower amounts of fraud than expected. The opposite is true when times are good;
now surprises lead to higher-than-expected fraud.
It is also important to note that, in the last case, even fraudulent ﬁrms are surprised by
the extent of fraud. Although they have private information that they are in bad shape,
which is a somewhat negative signal for the economy as a whole, this is not the same as
knowing that many ﬁrms are in bad shape. In a more complex model, this can lead to
negative spillovers as ﬁrms with weak prospects who see others post high results feel more
pressure to do so themselves, precisely because neither they nor investors know whether the
others are committing fraud. Something of this sort seems to have happened in the case
of WorldCom, whose fraudulent reporting in the 1990s increased the pressure on its rivals
29(Schiesel, 2002).
6 Robustness and Extensions
In order to streamline our exposition, our analysis has made use of several simplifying as-
sumptions. In this section, we discuss the consequences of loosening three of these: the
assumption that the relative numbers of good and bad ﬁrms are ﬁxed exogenously, the as-
sumption that the cost of fraud is ﬁxed exogenously, and the assumption that only bad ﬁrms
commit fraud. As we will see, allowing for endogenous entry or costs of fraud that depend on
the probability of getting caught do not change the thrust of our results. Allowing good ﬁrms
to commit fraud does not change most of our results, but sometimes causes complications
that could be resolved in a richer model.
6.1 Allowing Entry and Exit of Firms
Our model has assumed that the distribution of good and bad ﬁrms – encapsulated in the
prior ¹, which is the proportion of good ﬁrms in the economy – is ﬁxed exogenously. Based
on the experience of the 1990s boom, however, one might argue that these numbers should
be somewhat ﬂexible, as changing beliefs lead to exit and entry by ﬁrms. For example,
optimistic beliefs on the part of investors and managers should lead to more entry, especially
by managers of bad ﬁrms. To the extent investors anticipate this, this should limit just
how optimistic beliefs about the distribution of ﬁrms can be. Conversely, pessimistic beliefs
should lead to exit, especially by bad ﬁrms; this would limit how pessimistic beliefs can be.
Suppose then that the initial distribution of ﬁrms is weighted towards good ﬁrms; to be
speciﬁc, the initial proportion of good ﬁrms is ¹0, where ¹0 is in the Fund-Everything regime.
Managers with bad potential projects should then enter the market, bearing any costs of
seeking funds (getting matched with an investor) in the hopes of getting control beneﬁts. If
investor beliefs did not change, such entry would continue until the supply of potential bad
ﬁrms is exhausted or the marginal bad ﬁrm has a cost of seeking funds equal to the control
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some lower ¹1. The prior might fall enough to cross into the Optimistic regime or even lower,
where ﬁrms are sometimes monitored or denied funding; this would lower the probability
that bad ﬁrms could get funding, making entry less attractive and lowering the critical cost
of seeking funds at which entry is just attractive.
At the other extreme, suppose that the initial distribution is weighted towards bad ﬁrms:
¹0 falls into the No-Trust regime. In this case, either investors may choose to fund no one,
or, if monitoring costs are suﬃciently low, ﬁrms can only get funded if they are monitored
ﬁrst. In the ﬁrst case, all ﬁrms would exit rather than incur costs of seeking funds, leaving
the economy in autarky. In the second case, only bad ﬁrms would exit; this would raise
the prior, possibly moving the economy into a regime where bad ﬁrms have some chance of
being funded (and thus lowering the cost of seeking funds at which a bad ﬁrm is indiﬀerent
to exiting or staying in the market).
From this discussion, it is obvious that the number of potential bad ﬁrms and the distri-
bution of their costs of seeking funds would be key factors. So long as the supply of ﬁrms
(and especially bad ﬁrms) is somewhat inelastic, however, our main results would be unaf-
fected: very optimistic or pessimistic beliefs might not be sustainable in equilibrium, but
there would still be a range of equilibrium priors supporting the diﬀerent regimes we have
analyzed.
6.2 Explicit Detection of Fraud
We have assumed that fraud has a ﬁxed cost f. This is consistent with a model in which
fraud has some ﬁxed eﬀort cost ", after which it may be detected by the authorities with
ﬁxed probability ® and ﬁxed punishment (if caught) P, such that " + ®P = f. In practice,
however, this formulation is overly simplistic. If a ﬁrm is actually funded, transaction data
is generated and future performance may be scrutinized and compared to earlier reports;
thus, the authorities may ﬁnd it easier to catch fraud committed by ﬁrms that are actually
funded. Similarly, investors who monitor should have a better chance of detecting possible
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Accordingly, suppose that the probability of being caught after committing fraud, ®,
varies directly with the probability that the (bad) ﬁrm is funded and with the probability
that the ﬁrm is monitored: with probability ! > 0, the regulatory authorities (such as the
SEC) catch fraudulent ﬁrms that are funded without being monitored, and with probability
one, investors catch fraudulent ﬁrms that they monitor. (Implicitly, we are assuming that
the authorities cannot investigate all funded transactions.) Then the probability of being
caught is ® = (¯+±)(·h!+¸h)+(1¡¯¡±)(·`!+¸`), where once more ·s is the probability
of getting unmonitored funding when the free signal is s and ¸s is the probability of being
monitored when the free signal is s. Given an eﬀort cost " for committing fraud, it follows
that the total cost of committing fraud is still f = " + ®P, but now ® depends on the
probabilities with which ﬁrms are monitored and with which they are given unmonitored
funding.
This does not aﬀect the basic outline of our results. To see why, note that the ﬁrm’s
decision to commit fraud is based on the gain from committing fraud versus the cost. In
our simple model, the gain is the expected increase in the chance of getting unmonitored
funding times the control beneﬁt, or ±(·h ¡·`)C; the cost is f = "+®P. It is easy to show
that if ±C < " + (¯ + ±)!P, the beneﬁt ±(·h ¡ ·`)C is always less than the cost " + ®P,
so fraud is never attractive. Consistent with our emphasis before, we will assume that ±C
exceeds " + (¯ + ±)!P so that fraud is in fact possible.
First, consider the case where monitoring costs are so high that investors never monitor
(m > m). It is easy to show that, in this region, the boundaries of the ﬁve regimes are
precisely as before. For example, in the No-Trust regime, ·h = ·` = 0, so there is no
incentive to commit fraud. The boundary between this regime and the Skeptical regime is
the point at which unmonitored funding for high-signal ﬁrms is just attractive, assuming the
probability of fraud is zero; this occurs when the posterior b ¹h(0) satisﬁes b ¹h(0) = ¹1(m).
This condition does not depend on the cost of fraud, and so the boundary of the No-Trust
regime is unaﬀected by the form of the cost of fraud.
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commit fraud. The boundary between this regime and the Optimistic regime is determined
by the condition b ¹`(0) = ¹3(m). Again, this condition does not depend on the cost of
fraud, and so this boundary is unaﬀected by the form of the cost of fraud. Furthermore, the
condition ±C > "+(¯+±)!P guarantees that it is feasible to have a Trust-Signals regime, and
then arguments along the lines just given prove that the boundaries of the Skeptical, Trust-
Signals, and Optimistic regimes will be as in Proposition 3. Nevertheless, in the Skeptical
and Optimistic regimes the probabilities with which investors provide unmonitored ﬁnance
will be aﬀected by the form of the cost of fraud, since the probability ® of detecting fraud
depends on these probabilities.6
If monitoring costs are low enough to permit monitoring (m < m), matters are slightly
more complex. Now, the fact that investors who monitor always catch fraud may shift the
lower boundary of the region where fraud occurs with some probability. To see why, note
that if investors always monitored all ﬁrms in the No-Trust regime, then a manager who
committed fraud would be caught for certain and thus face cost " + P. This may exceed
the maximum beneﬁt of fraud, which is ±C. In this case, investors might actually be able
to scale back monitoring, providing high-signal ﬁrms with unmonitored ﬁnance some of the
time, without provoking fraud. Eventually, if the probability of unmonitored ﬁnance is
high enough (and so the probability of monitored ﬁnance is low enough), some fraud will be
attractive. The upshot is that part of the Skeptical regime may now be free of fraud. Indeed,
if P is high enough, even the Trust-Signals regime may be partially free of fraud, the reason
being that monitoring of low-signal ﬁrms may be enough to deter fraud.
From this discussion, it follows that the main qualitative eﬀect of having the cost of fraud
reﬂect the probability of being caught (and, in particular, the probability of being monitored)
is that when monitoring costs are suﬃciently low, the region where fraud is possible may
6In particular, in the Skeptical regime, the probability ·h with which high-signal ﬁrms are given unmon-
itored ﬁnance will be higher than it would be if the cost of fraud f was equal to " alone. In the Optimistic
regime, the probability ·` with which high-signal ﬁrms are given unmonitored ﬁnance will be lower than it
would be if the cost of fraud f was equal to " alone. Essentially, the possibility of catching fraud raises the
cost of fraud; this means that the beneﬁt ±(·h¡·`)C and thus the diﬀerence ·h¡·` must be larger in order
to get the manager to be indiﬀerent between committing fraud and not committing fraud.
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between fraud and “good times.”
6.3 Good Firms and Fraud
We have assumed that only managers of bad ﬁrms commit fraud. We now discuss how our
results would be aﬀected if managers of good ﬁrms could commit fraud. In a nutshell, there
would be little change in our results in four of the ﬁve regimes – Skeptical, Trust-Signals,
Optimistic, and Fund-Everything – but behavior in the No-Trust regime might be aﬀected.
To see this, suppose that a good ﬁrm can commit fraud at cost f0, in which case its chance
of producing a high signal goes from ° to ° + ±0, where f0 ¸ f and ±0 < ±. We assume that
the cost of fraud is higher for good ﬁrms because, in a less stylized model, managers of good
ﬁrms should have more to lose from being caught than managers of bad ﬁrms. For example,
in a multiperiod setting, managers of good ﬁrms might ﬁnd that being caught committing
fraud ruins their chances of getting funding in the future – e.g., from SEC penalties. In
that case, a good manager may be better oﬀ taking a higher chance of sending low signals
now and not getting funding for current expansion, since she can return to the market the
following period and try again. Similarly, we assume that fraud is more eﬀective for bad
ﬁrms because fraud should have a higher expected impact on bad ﬁrms’ results than on good
ﬁrms’ results.
Now consider when a good ﬁrm would commit fraud. As for bad ﬁrms, the good ﬁrm’s
goal of fraud is to reduce the chance of being denied funding. If there is no investor monitoring
(m > m), committing fraud increases a good ﬁrm’s chance of getting funding by ±0(·h ¡·`),
as compared with ±(·h¡·`) for bad ﬁrms. It follows that good ﬁrms have weaker incentives
to commit fraud than do bad ﬁrms, and so the probability with which they commit fraud will
be weakly lower than that with which bad ﬁrms commit fraud. All else equal, if good ﬁrms do
commit fraud, the free signal actually becomes more informative, since a high signal is now
more likely to come from a good ﬁrm. Since high signals are more attractive, this actually
increases the incentives for bad ﬁrms to commit fraud. Nevertheless, the main thrust of our
34results would not be aﬀected.
Suppose instead that investor monitoring is feasible (m < m). In this case, the incentives
for fraud diﬀer qualitatively between good ﬁrms and bad ﬁrms. Bad ﬁrms wish to avoid being
monitored, since this reveals them as bad; good ﬁrms do not mind being monitored, since
this reveals them as good. It follows that in any regime where low-signal ﬁrms are monitored
more frequently than high-signal ﬁrms, bad ﬁrms will have strictly more incentive to commit
fraud than do good ﬁrms.
By contrast, if low-signal ﬁrms are monitored less frequently than high-signal ﬁrms, and
ﬁrms are denied funding if they are not monitored, incentives reverse. (This corresponds
to the sub-region marked “Monitor High Signals” in Figure 3, and its extension into the
regions where fraud is possible.) Now, bad ﬁrms are not interested in committing fraud,
because even a high signal cannot get them unmonitored funding, but good ﬁrms wish to be
monitored so that they can prove their type. It follows that in this region, good ﬁrms may
commit fraud with higher probability than bad ﬁrms.
Because this tends to occur for lower priors on the probability that ﬁrms are good, this
runs counter to our main result that fraud is more prevalent for better priors. Nevertheless,
this result must be taken with a grain of salt, since it requires that good ﬁrms who commit
fraud are monitored and then not penalized by investors or the authorities for committing
fraud. In practice, this seems unlikely. The act of committing fraud is not only a signal of
incentives but a signal of a manager’s ethics. In a less stylized model, ﬁnding out that a
manager was willing to commit fraud in order to alter investor incentives is likely to be a bad
signal for the future – after all, what will this manager be willing to do when the ﬁrm is truly
in bad shape? If honesty is to be preferred in general, investors as well as the authorities
may wish to replace a fraudulent manager now even if the underlying ﬁrm is good. In this
case, good ﬁrms’ incentives to commit fraud so as to be monitored disappear, and we are
back to the situation analyzed in the base model.
To summarize this discussion, allowing good managers to commit fraud only has a major
impact on our results when both monitoring costs and priors are relatively low, so that good
35ﬁrms may wish to commit fraud in order to boost their chances of being monitored. Never-
theless, this relies on the simplicity of our single-period model. In a model that incorporates
multiple periods, investors and regulatory authorities are likely to wish to penalize fraudu-
lent managers even if their ﬁrms prove to have good prospects. If this is the case, managers
at good ﬁrms will have lower incentives to commit fraud even when priors are low, and the
qualitative results of our base model continue to apply.
7 Conclusion
We have presented a simple model of incentives for ﬁrms to commit fraud in order to get funds
from investors. Despite its simplicity, the model can motivate several patterns of behavior,
such as changes in the prevalence of fraud over the business cycle and across diﬀerent sectors
and counterintuitive eﬀects of changes in monitoring costs and investor priors. It also has
some implications for policy on disclosure standards.
368 References
Bebchuk, Lucian, and Oren Bar-Gill (2002), “Misreporting Corporate Performance.” Work-
ing paper, Harvard University.
Caplan, Dennis (1999), “Internal Controls and the Detection of Management Fraud.” Jour-
nal of Accounting Research 37:1 (Spring), 101-117.
Dechow, Patricia, Richard Sloan, and Amy Sweeney (1996), “Causes and Consequences of
Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the
SEC.” Contemporary Accounting Research, 13:1 (Spring), 1-36.
Economist (2002), “Thumped.” Economist, July 13, 2002.
Feroz, Ehsan, Kyungjoo Park, and Victor Pastena (1991), “The Financial and Market
Eﬀects of the SEC’s Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases.” Journal of Ac-
counting Research 29, Studies on Accounting Institutions in Markets and Organiza-
tions, 107-142.
Galbraith, John Kenneth (1955), The Great Crash: 1929. Riverside Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
Goldman, Eitan, and Steve Slezak (2003), “The Economics of Fraudulent Misreporting.”
Working paper, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill.
Kaplan, Steven, and Jeremy Stein (1993), “The Evolution of Buyout Pricing and Financial
Structure in the 1980s.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108:2 (May), 313-357.
Labaton, Stephen (2002), “Downturn and Shift in Population Feed Boom in White-Collar
Crime.” New York Times, June 2, 2002.
Morton, Sanford (1993), “Strategic Auditing for Fraud.” Accounting Review 68:4 (October),
825-839.
37Newman, D. P., and J. Noel (1989), “Error Rates, Detection Rates, and Payoﬀ Functions
in Auditing.” Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory (Supplement 1989), 50-63.
Noe, Thomas H. (2003), “Tunnel-Prooﬁng the Executive Suite: Transparency, Temptation,
and the Design of Executive Compensation.” Working Paper, Tulane University.
Persons, John, and Vincent Warther (1997), “Boom and Bust Patterns in the Adoption of
Financial Innovations.” Review of Financial Studies 10:4 (Winter), 939-967.
Ruckes, Martin (1998), “Competing Banks, Credit Standards, and Corporate Conser-
vatism.” Working paper, University of Mannheim.
Schenone, Carola (2003), “The Eﬀect of Banking Relationships on the Firm’s IPO Under-
pricing.” Working paper, University of Minnesota.
Schiesel, Seth (2002), “Trying to Catch WorldCom’s Mirage.” New York Times, June 30,
2002.
Schilit, Howard (2002), Financial Shenanigans. McGraw-Hill, New York.
Shibano, Toshiyuki (1990), “Assessing Audit Risk from Errors and Irregularities.” Journal
of Accounting Research (Supplement 1990), 110-140.
Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar (2003), “Disclosure, Intelligence, and Financial Markets: Some
Perspectives.” Working paper, UCLA.
38Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Investing without monitoring dominates not investing iﬀ VU > VN () b ¹Ng ¡(1 ¡ b ¹)Nb >
0 () b ¹ >
Nb
Nb+Ng. Monitoring and investing in the good ﬁrm dominates not investing iﬀ
VM > VN () b ¹Ng ¡ m > 0 () b ¹ > m
Ng. Investing without monitoring dominates
monitoring and investing in the good ﬁrm iﬀ VU > VM () b ¹Ng ¡ (1 ¡ b ¹)Nb > b ¹Ng ¡
m () b ¹ > 1 ¡ m
Nb. Threshold for m: monitoring is dominated if b ¹ · m
Ng and b ¹ ¸ 1 ¡ m
Nb;
combine b ¹ = m
Ng and b ¹ = 1 ¡ m
Nb, which yields 1 ¡ m
Nb = m
Ng, and the deﬁnition of m.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The cut-oﬀs for the ﬁve regimes can equivalently be deﬁned using cut-oﬀs for the posterior
beliefs. Recall from (2) that
b ¹` (0) < b ¹` (1) < b ¹h (1) < b ¹h (0):
These four cut-oﬀs in the interval [0;1] deﬁne the ﬁve regimes, depending on the location
of ¹3 (m) in relation to the four cut-oﬀs (for example, the Fund-Everything regime has
b ¹` (0) > ¹3 (m)).
² The proofs for the Fund-Everything and No-Trust regimes are straightforward.
² The Optimistic regime: Á 2 (0;1] such that ¹3 (m) < b ¹` (Á) cannot be an equilibrium.
If it was, ` signals would not be monitored, so there would be no beneﬁt from com-
mitting fraud, i.e. Á = 0. Similarly, Á 2 [0;1) such that ¹3 (m) > b ¹` (Á) cannot be an
equilibrium. If it was, ` signals would be either monitored or rejected, while h signals
receive unmonitored ﬁnancing; so there would be an incentive to increase Á. So in
equilibrium, the bad ﬁrm chooses Á 2 (0;1) such that with a signal `,











39Next, ·h < 1 cannot be an equilibrium, since ¹3 (m) < b ¹h (Á) 8Á. Therefore, ·h = 1
and ¸h = 0.
·` = 1 cannot be an equilibrium. If it was, there would be no incentive for bad ﬁrms
to commit fraud, and therefore ﬁrms with a signal ` should not receive unmonitored
ﬁnancing. Similarly, ·` + ¸` < 1 cannot be an equilibrium. If it was, ` signals would
be rejected with positive probability. But that is not optimal for the investor since
b ¹` (Á) = ¹3 > ¹1, i.e. she strictly prefers monitoring an ` signal to rejecting it. Next,
¸` = 1, ·` = 0 cannot be an equilibrium. If it was, bad ﬁrms would commit fraud
with certainty. So in equilibrium, the investor chooses ¸` and ·` such that ¸` 2 (0;1),
¸` + ·` = 1, and




² The Trust-Signals regime: b ¹` (0) < b ¹` (1) < ¹3 (m) < b ¹h (1) < b ¹h (0), so ` signals are
rejected or monitored while h signals are ﬁnanced without monitoring. By assumption,
±C > f, so it pays for a bad ﬁrm to increase Á up to one. Signals ` are monitored iﬀ
b ¹` (1) ¸ ¹1 (m) ()
¹

















² The Skeptical regime: Á 2 (0;1] such that ¹3 (m) > b ¹h (Á) cannot be an equilibrium.
If it was, all ﬁrms would be either monitored or rejected, and there would be no beneﬁt
from committing fraud. Similarly, Á 2 [0;1) such that ¹3 (m) < b ¹h (Á) cannot be an
equilibrium. If it was, h signals would receive unmonitored ﬁnancing, while ` signals
would be either monitored or rejected, giving bad ﬁrms an incentive to increase Á. So
in equilibrium, the bad ﬁrm chooses Á such that with a signal h,











If Á is such that b ¹h (Á) = ¹3 (m), the investor is indiﬀerent between monitored and
unmonitored ﬁnance for h signals, and she prefers either option to rejecting an h signal;
40therefore ¸h+·h = 1. The investor mixes between monitored and unmonitored ﬁnance
for h signals, such that a bad ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between committing fraud and not:




So ¸h = 1 ¡ ·h = 1 ¡
f
±C. Finally, ·` > 0 cannot be an equilibrium. If it was, then
b ¹` (Á) ¸ ¹3 (m) = b ¹h (Á), contradiction. So bad ﬁrms with an ` signal cannot expect
to get ﬁnancing at all. In equilibrium, ` signals are monitored iﬀ












A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
² The proofs for the Fund-Everything, Trust-Signals and No-Trust regimes are straight-
forward.
² The Optimistic regime: ·h = 1 since ¹2 < b ¹h (1) < b ¹h (0). Next, Á = 0 can not
be an equilibrium. The investor would not ﬁnance with a signal `, since b ¹` (0) < ¹2.
But then a bad would ﬁrm prefer to increase Á2 above zero, since ±C > f. Similarly,
Á = 1 can not be an equilibrium. The investor would ﬁnance with any signal, so there
would be no need to invest f. Next, ·` = 0 cannot be an equilibrium. All bad ﬁrms
would commit fraud with certainty, and the investor should then provide unmonitored
ﬁnance for either signal, since ¹2 < b ¹` (1). Finally, ·` = 1 cannot be an equilibrium.
Bad ﬁrms would not commit fraud, and the investor should then reject ` signals, since
b ¹` (0) < ¹2. So the equilibrium must be in mixed strategies for both players. The bad
ﬁrm chooses Á such that with a signal `,











41The investor chooses ·` such that




² The Skeptical regime: Á = 0 can not be an equilibrium. The investor would not ﬁnance
with a signal `, since b ¹` (0) < ¹2. But then a bad would ﬁrm prefer to increase Á2
above zero, since ±C > f. Similarly, Á = 1 can not be an equilibrium. If it was,
the investor would not ﬁnance any ﬁrm, so there would be no need to commit fraud.
Next, ·h = 0 cannot be an equilibrium. No ﬁrm would be ﬁnanced, and therefore
bad ﬁrms would not commit fraud; but then the investor should ﬁnance all h signals,
since ¹2 < b ¹h (0). Finally, ·h = 1 cannot be an equilibrium. Bad ﬁrms would have
an incentive to commit fraud with probability 1; but then the investor should reject
all signals, since b ¹h (1) < ¹2. So the equilibrium must be in mixed strategies for both
players. The bad ﬁrm chooses Á such that with a signal h,











The investor chooses ·` such that




A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The conditional probabilities are derived in Proposition 2. The ex-ante probability of fraud
is calculated as (1 ¡ ¹)Á in each regime.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Follows immediately from (A2).
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Follows immediately from (A1).
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